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1 Introduction
Ambiguity aversion is frequently used to explain puzzles and promote policies. In this
paper we propose an alternative explanation for the empirical evidence on which findings for
ambiguity aversion rest. Ambiguity aversion is the interpretation of the experimental find-
ing (Ellsberg paradox) that most subjects violate probabilistic sophistication: They prefer
betting on events whose probabilities are known (objective) to betting on events whose prob-
abilities are unknown to them (subjective). The observation that people exhibit the Ellsberg
paradox is generally interpreted as a preference of the people. However in typical experiments
these unknown probabilities are known and often determined by the experimenter. Thus the
typical Ellsberg experiment is a situation of asymmetric information. People may try to
avoid situations where they are the less informed party in an asymmetric situation setting.
Indeed doing so is often normatively appropriate. Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) advanced
the theoretical argument that Ellsberg-style choices reflect misplaced heuristics, a mental
shortcut where “a difficult question is answered by substituting an answer to an easier one”
(Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Our argument and empirical test focuses on asymmetric
information present in typical Ellsberg experiments. If the Ellsberg paradox is an unusual,
cognitively demanding situation for decision-makers, the situation might be substituted for
a more familiar one, that of disadvantageous asymmetric information (the misapplication of
a heuristic). In cases of disadvantageous asymmetric information—think of Akerlof’s famous
market for lemons—it is usually a good idea to avoid trade or to prefer trade in situations
without such asymmetric information. This heuristic rule to avoid trade in situations of
disadvantageous asymmetric information may be ecologically rational in many real world
situations, but it is not in the specific situation of the Ellsberg paradox. Our innovation is to
create an experiment that takes away the informational disadvantage subjects have vis-à-vis
the experimenter but leaves ambiguity in place.
In the traditional Ellsberg thought experiments, the source of ambiguity is generated by
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the experimenter: For example, she presents the decision-maker with an urn of 100 balls
which are red or black, but the exact composition is unknown to the subjects. But the
experimenter knows, or participants may at least suspect the experimenter knows, the true
proportion of red and black balls. Thus participants perceive this as a situation of asymmetric
information. In the real world it is often a good idea to be careful in situations where
you have an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a potential counterparty, and indeed to
avoid binding commitments in such situations altogether. In many situations such avoidance
behavior makes strategic sense even for probabilistically sophisticated subjects, as Morris
(1997) showed.1 Thus an experimental finding like the Ellsberg paradox could be due to
subjects misunderstanding the situation or misapplying (or correctly applying) the heuristic
of avoiding situations of disadvantageous informational asymmetry rather than ambiguity
aversion.
One way to attenuate the problem of informational asymmetry is to use a source of
ambiguity that, unlike Ellsberg’s ambiguous urn, is not generated by the experimenter. Fox
and Tversky (1995, study 4) pioneer the experimental use of natural sources of ambiguity
using bets on the future temperature in a familiar and an unfamiliar city of similar climate.2
This cures one problem of the Ellsberg urn, which puts the source of ambiguity outside the
control of the experimenter. But this at most slightly reduces the informational advantage
of the experimenter: after all, the experimenter had the opportunity to look up historical
temperature records prior to the study, and presumably did so to calibrate the questions
and payments. This of course is a problem with presumably any natural source of ambiguity:
subjects may always believe that the experimenter had the opportunity to invest more time
in researching records or estimates of the event to be predicted.
Other experiments also reduce the asymmetry between the experimenter and subject.
Hey et al. (2010) use a bingo blower to eliminate suspicion: the bingo blower is a physical
1“It is argued that proponents of subjective expected utility have always understood that a ‘bid–ask spread’
in rational individuals’ willingness to bet is consistent with SEU maximization in the presence of private
information.”
2Abdellaoui et al. (2011) is another paper on natural ambiguity.
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and transparent device which clearly cannot be manipulated by the experimenter to pick a
particular ball. However, the informational asymmetry between the experimenter and the
subjects remains. Strategic ambiguity remains since someone (usually the experimenter) must
have filled the blower with differently colored balls and knows the true distribution. While
subjects can see all the balls in the bingo blower, due to the rapid movement it is impossible to
count them (if it were possible, there would be no ambiguity, and only risk). Trautmann and
Zeckhauser (2013) give subjects a choice between an objective and ambiguous urn. Subjects
fill both urns themselves, once wearing a blindfold, drawing from a box with 50 red and 50
black chips. Technically, this is risk, since there is an objective probability as the chips are
countable. Kocher et al. (2015) has a student assistant blindly draw from an opaque bag,
and from the instructions, subjects only learn that a student assistant drew the bag. Our
design makes it clear that the other subjects are filling the urn, rather than affiliates of the
experimenter. Oechssler and Roomets (2015) addressed the concern that subjects believe that
they play a game against the experimenter by filling the urn through an irregular Galton box
(balls would bounce left and right as they fall down a slope). The box is created by volunteer
students hammering nails in it not knowing for what purpose. The total number of balls
in the different bags collecting balls below the box would then determine the content of the
urn. They find that the majority of subjects were ambiguity averse, and at a similar rate
as with strategic ambiguity. One concern is that subjects were explicitly told the objective
was to make the content of the bag unpredictable, which may result in subjects avoiding the
unpredictable bag, and subtle forms of experimenter demand can affect behavior (Cilliers et
al. 2015).
We think that some of the experimental findings could often be interpreted as experi-
menter demand: A subject is given two options which only differ in their amount of subjective
uncertainty but which are equally valuable for anyone satisfying subjective expected utility,
so a subject might feel he is expected to choose the option exhibiting less subjective uncer-
tainty. Trautmann et al. (2008) employ a design where the preference of the subject over a
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pair of DVDs is private information, unknown to the experimenter, so that the experimenter
cannot know more about the probability of getting the preferred prize. The instructions em-
phasized to subjects not to tell their preference to the experimenter, which may heighten the
sense of adversarial asymmetric information. Our study removes the asymmetric information
and stays within the framework of the classical Ellsberg game.
Taken together our analysis complements the prior research designs. For law and policy,
it matters whether ambiguity aversion is a mistake or a consistent preference. Population
preferences should be taken into account by policy-makers3, while mistakes should not. This
paper asks the question if economically substantial ambiguity aversion really exists as a
preference or is rather due to misapplication of a heuristic. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Ellsberg Paradox and briefly reviews the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents a vignette experiment. Section 4 presents an incentivized experiment.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Ambiguity aversion has a long history in the study of individual decision making in psy-
chology and in economics, and has also been the subject of much theoretical modeling in
economics (Machina 2014). We briefly reproduce the classic Ellsberg Paradox. An urn is
filled with 15 balls. As in Ellsberg (1961) the color of a third of the balls is known to be red.
The remaining balls are black or white4 in unknown combination. We follow Halevy (2007)
in setting the number of subjective balls at 10.5
Urns
Ellsberg experiment








3Though arguably not all preferences, see Harsanyi (1982, p.56) arguing that “sadism, ill will, or malice”
should not count.
4We use white instead of yellow following Machina.
5In Ellsberg the number of balls was 90.
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• Bet on Red: If a red ball is drawn you get $x, else you get $0.
• Bet on White: If a white ball is drawn you get $x+ ε (ε > 0). Else you get $0.
• Bet on Black: If a black ball is drawn you get $x+ ε. Else you get $0.
Proposition 1 A probabilistically sophisticated decision-maker who satisfies first-order
stochastic dominance and strict monotonicity in money and satisfies reduction of compound
lotteries, strictly prefers “Bet on White” to “Bet on Red” or strictly prefers “Bet on Black”
to “Bet on Red”.
Proof: A probabilistically sophisticated decision maker (DM) has some subjective prob-
ability distribution for experiment t, such that ptR =
1
3
, ptW + ptB =
2
3
(if in addition to
probabilistic sophistication she accepts informational symmetry between W and B, then in
particular ptW = ptB =
1
3






















for black. It is sufficient to
show that at least one of “Bet on Black” or “Bet on White” stochastically dominates “Bet
on Red”. Suppose “Bet on White” does not stochastically dominate “Bet on Red”: Then as
ε > 0 we must have ptW <
1
3
, which in turn implies that ptB >
1
3
meaning that “Bet on Black”
stochastically dominates “Bet on Red”. Q.E.D.
In vignette studies, even after being advised about the Ellsberg paradox, 80% of subjects
still exhibit ambiguity aversion (Slovic and Tversky 1974).
Ambiguity aversion has been used to explain many economic puzzles. For example, Erbas
and Mirakhor (2007) and Maenhout (2004) attribute part of the equity premium to aver-
sion to ambiguity. Erbas and Mirakhor (2007) write a “large part of equity premium may
reflect investor aversion to ambiguities resulting from institutional weaknesses.” Epstein and
Schneider (2008) explain volatility in stock markets with ambiguity-averse investors who
process news of uncertain quality and act as if they take a worst-case assessment of quality.
As a result, they react more strongly to bad news than to good news. DeLong and Magin
(2009) caution: “A bias-based psychological explanation must account not just for the bias,
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but for the failure of investors to deal with their biases the way that Ulysses dealt with the
Sirens–by building institutions that tie themselves to the mast. That issue remains largely
unanswered.”
In legal applications, Talley (2009) finds that contract provisions in corporate acquisitions
are consistent with ambiguity aversion. For incomplete contracts, Mukerji (1998) model an
ambiguity-averse decision maker who adjusts his choice on the side of caution in response to
his imprecise knowledge of the odds, and evaluates an act by the minimum expected value
that may be associated with contract clauses. Ghirardato et al. (2000) explain selective
abstention in elections, where ambiguity aversion about the candidates’ policy positions can
make abstention look to the voter a smaller “mistake” than voting for one of the candidates.
Baliga et al. (2013) uses ambiguity aversion to explain polarization of beliefs even when
individuals are interpreting identical information.
Ambiguity aversion has also been used to promote policies. Segal and Stein (2005) con-
tend that defendants are more ambiguity averse than prosecutors, so the criminal process
systematically results in defendants forced into harsh plea bargains. Viscusi and Zeckhauser
(2006) argue that policymakers should collect data on ambiguity aversion to address risks
surrounding environmental protection and medical malpractice. Lawsky (2013) proposes tax
reforms that account for an ambiguity averse decision-maker who does not know the proba-
bility of audits. Farnsworth et al. (2010) discuss ambiguity of legal text, which can potentially
be modeled with ambiguity aversion.
Besides Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009)’s theoretical critique of findings of ambiguity
aversion as possibly the result of mental heuristics, another recent theoretical and empirical
contribution is Halevy (2007), which argues that aversion to compound lotteries goes a long
way towards explaining aversion towards genuine ambiguity. He finds that a substantial
fraction of subjects are ambiguity neutral and reduce compound lotteries, but that those
who are not ambiguity neutral almost always fail to reduce compound lotteries; ambiguity
reduces the willingness to pay by about the same amount as just introducing a compound
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lottery with the same resulting probabilities as the original objective urn.
Other evidence in Fox and Tversky (1995) indicate that ambiguity aversion basically dis-
appears in noncomparative contexts, where ambiguous prospects are evaluated in isolation,
and not in comparison to prospects with known probabilities. Chow and Sarin (2002) conduct
a non-incentivized study using three types of urns, a standard objective one, an Ellsberg type
one, and one where the there is an objective probability in a second order type. Whenever
they elicit just the valuation of one urn they find no difference in willingness to pay across
these types of urns. Their finding is in line with differences emerging only when subjects are
presented with objective and subjective problems at the same time. This study also have sub-
jects draw candy from a bag of M&M’s, but the comparison was still across subjects rather
than within subjects. Fox and Tversky (1995) argue that “comparative ignorance” seems to
account for ambiguity aversion to a large extent. Their hypothesis is that ambiguity aversion
results from comparisons with either other agents who have more information, or with acts
that have less subjective uncertainty. Since developments in economic theory appear to ig-
nore the challenge that ambiguity aversion disappears in noncomparative contexts, we keep
close to the original experiment to more directly confront the evidence on which the theory
is built.
3 Vignette Experiment
We propose a new thought experiment to contrast with the original Ellsberg thought
experiment and the compound lottery analog, and then proceed to employ it in the laboratory
in different variations. The central innovation is that fellow participants, rather than the
experimenter, choose the contents of the ambiguous urn, and do so while remaining in a
situation of ambiguity rather than risk. In our experiment, each subject gets an individual
ambiguous urn. Each subject gets to co-determine the contents of the ambiguous urns of all
the other participants.
3.1 Majority determines outcome An even number N of participants is invited to
a laboratory session. There are two sources of uncertainty, an objective one and an ambiguous
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one. The objective source is a standard fair coin whose draw is determined by a computer.
Then for each participant there is an ambiguous coin. Each participant chooses to send
one of two symbols to the ambiguous source of the other participants. That choice has no
consequence for the payoff of the sender herself. The ambiguous coin of participant i is
defined to fall on symbol A if the majority of the other participants (of which there are an
odd number) choose A than B, else it is defined to fall on B. In other words, the symbol
is “drawn” from the ambiguous urn based on majority rule. Since A and B have a natural
order, and participants might always send A, we use different symbol pairs for which no such
natural order exists.
In addition to sending a symbol to the ambiguous coin of the other participants, which
is a non-incentivized task, each participant also chooses one of four bets. The participant
can bet on heads or tails (i.e., bet on something objective) or bet on symbol A or symbol B
(i.e., bet on something ambiguous). If the participant wins the bet, she receives EUR4. The
way participants choose the bet is by stating their valuation for each of the four possible
bets. They then receive the bet with the highest stated valuation for free. The original
instructions in German are in Appendix A and the English translation in Appendix B. On
a single screen, people see the instructions, and make a choice about the symbol to send
and the bet to choose. E.g., send a symbol (for you personally irrelevant, order randomized).
Then, subjects were asked how much is each bet worth and told that they would receive the
one they value most.
Each of an even number N of participants, chooses one of two options, either “heart”
or “smiley.” This generates a metaphorical and subjective coin for each participant: For
participant i, the metaphorical coin is defined to fall on “heart” if more than half of the other
participants choose “heart” than “smiley,” else it is defined to fall on “smiley.”
It is important to note that in the design, we randomly vary the order in which the bets
are mentioned and presented (participants are made aware of this), such that using what is
mentioned first as a focal point is prevented. People are explicitly told that symbol order is
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randomized.
Probabilistically sophisticated subjects have a single belief about the probabilities. If
that belief happens to be 50%, then a subject is indifferent between all four bets offered.
Otherwise, there exists a symbol such that the subject strictly prefers betting on that symbol
to betting on heads or tails. In the experimental design, moreover, we allow participants to
express indifference, and also ask them for their (non-incentivized) valuation of each lottery,
as shown in Appendix Figure A.1.
3.2 Results We ran experiments in Zurich using oTree (Chen et al. 2016). We con-
ducted a total of 16 experimental sessions with 418 participants. In the 16 sessions, 11 distinct
symbols pairs were used, of these 11 pairs, 3 pairs (heart vs. smiley, down-left vs. down-right
angle) were used in two sessions and 1 pair (large vs. small circle) was used in three sessions.
We discuss the results using the first session of the pair that was used in three sessions. The
symbols used here were a large empty circle, and a small full circle, and are shown in the ap-
pendix. Thus focal features of what one “should” use conflict here, choosing the larger object
vs. choosing something that is full rather than empty. Recall that in any case, participants
have no monetary incentive whatsoever in their own choice of symbol (to send to others), as
it is payoff irrelevant for them. Figure 1 consists of four sub-panels, and we will explain it in
detail here. Analogous figures for each of the other 15 sessions are in Appendix C. First, as
shown in the legend of the figure, the blue colors always correspond to objective uncertainty
(dark blue to heads; light blue to tails), while the red colors correspond to the subjective
uncertainty.
The subpanel on the top left gives the symbol choices of the participants. The symbol
choice has no effect for a participant herself, just for those of the other participants who
chose to bet on the subjective source of uncertainty. In this session of the 28 subjects, 13
chose the large empty circle, and 15 chose the small full circle. The subpanel on the bottom
left represents an attempt to gauge what probabilities of a symbol winning a rational actor
would estimate. For the objective source of uncertainty, the probability of head and tail is
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50% each and shown in the left bar. This of course is constant across all sessions.
For the subjective source of uncertainty, the question of what probability to estimate
is somewhat trickier. We chose all symbol pairs such that we thought the symbols are in-
terchangeable, and our prior of any symbol in a pair being chosen by a majority of the
participants was 50%. Thus, when interpreting the data this should be kept in mind. The
second bar in the subpanel of the bottom left imagines a participant who almost clairvoyantly
knows what fraction of people chose each symbol. So in this session, for example, consider
one of the 15 participants who thinks that the probability that another participant chooses
large circle is 13
27
.6 From her perspective, the probability that the majority of participants
chose small circle can be calculated using the cumulative binomial distribution where n = 27
and p = 13
27
evaluated at 13, which is rounded in the figure to 58% (the 28% is what a
participant, who chose a large empty circle, would estimate).
The top right subpanel shows which bets participants chose. In our design, this choice was
done by indicating a willingness to pay for each of the four possible bets. A participant got
the bet for which she indicated the top willingness to pay. Thus, participants were permitted
to indicate indifference between choices, and in the figure, if a participant had multiple top
choices, the corresponding fractions are assigned to each option. In this figure, both subjective
acts are more popular than both objective acts. In the bottom right panel, the histograms
of the willingness to pay data are given. Note that other than that, a player would get the
option for which she indicated the highest willingness to pay, this was not incentivized. Still,
in vignette studies, even after being advised about the Ellsberg paradox, 80% of subjects
still exhibit ambiguity aversion (Slovic and Tversky 1974).
6The other 13 participants would think the probability another participant chooses large circle is 1227 .
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Overall, across all the sessions, the subjective acts were more popular than the objective
ones, contrary to what one would expect under ambiguity aversion. For each of the 16
sessions, individuals were more likely to bet on a symbol with subjective uncertainty, and in
all but 2 of the 16 sessions, both bets with subjective uncertainty were more popular than
the bets with objective uncertainty, as illustrated in Figure 1.
3.3 Regression analyses The following table presents analyses of the bet choice. The
regression variables are: (i) Choosing A, which is a dummy indicator for whether that player
put symbol A in other participants’ urns (we arbitrarily labeled a particular symbol as “A”);
(ii) Risk aversion, a measure of risk aversion; (iii) P(A wins), a binomial probability that
symbol A wins (i.e., the probability that symbol A was chosen by the majority of other
players); (iv) P(A)>.5, a dummy indicator for whether P(A wins) is larger than 0.5; (v) an
interaction of the last two variables.




Tails Symbol A Symbol B
Choosing A (d) -0.00597 0.484∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0440) (0.0448)
Risk aversion 0.00184 -0.00910 -0.00480
(0.00607) (0.00961) (0.00959)
P(A wins) 0.320 -0.0676 -0.255
(0.187) (0.305) (0.270)
P(A wins) x P(A)>.5 -0.512∗ 0.308 -0.172
(0.250) (0.420) (0.406)
P(A)>.5 (d) 0.238 -0.139 0.186
(0.174) (0.252) (0.250)
Observations 416 416 416
Xmfx_y 0.122 0.371 0.364
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
of the objective bet. Second, subjects often bet on the symbol that they put in others’
urn. Third, the true probability of the symbol winning was not significantly correlated with
subjects preferring to bet on that symbol.
4 Revealed Preference Experiment
4.1 Participant-generated Ellsberg urn Section 3 presented a design where a
metaphorical coin fell on “heart” or “smiley” depending on which symbol the majority of
the participants chose. This section has the ball drawn from an opaque urn with the exact
composition of balls unknown, only the total number known. The latter design is as close
as possible to the original Ellsberg-urn—with the composition determined not by the ex-
perimenter, but by subjects who fill the virtual urn of symbols for the other subjects in
the experiment. In addition, in the previous section, subjects reported which bet was most
valuable to them, but this choice was not incentivized. Still, to the extent subjects would just
pick randomly when indifferent, we should have observed an even distribution of preferred
choices, but we observed the subjective bets were preferred over the objective bets. This
section incentivizes the bet.
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Each subject again choose one of four acts: two objective acts and two subjective acts. The
two purely objective acts are ones where a subject gets EUR4, if and only if, she correctly
predicts the outcome of a fair coin. The outcome of the coin flip is publicly announced
and subjects can choose which side of the coin to bet on, so the experimenter cannot ex-
post somehow let the coin land on the opposite side of what the subject chose. The two
subjective acts are bets on drawings from a participant-generated urn. The contents of this
virtual urn is determined by what symbol the other subjects chose. For participant i, her
subjective Ellsberg urn has N−1 balls in it, one for each participant, labeled smiley or heart
according to the choices made by the other participants. One ball is drawn from that urn.
The participant learns of the result of the ball drawn and the composition of her Ellsberg
urn at the same time. Instructions and Nash equilibria in pure strategies are in Appendix D.
It is worth noting a subtle difference with the participant-generated urn rather than
the majority determines outcome design, which is that instead of counting the majority of
symbols sent (as the outcome of a virtual coin flip), one draws from a virtual urn containing
these symbols.
4.2 Results The results of this experiment are also presented in visual and regression
form. In the main text, we present the figure for one session. Analogous figures for each of
the other 4 sessions are in Appendix E. First, as shown in the legend of the figure, the blue
colors always correspond to objective uncertainty (dark blue to heads; light blue to tails),
while the red colors correspond to the subjective uncertainty.
The subpanel on the top left gives the symbol choices of the participants. The symbol
choice has no effect for a participant herself, just for those of the other participants who
chose to bet on the subjective source of uncertainty. In this session of the 30 subjects, 40%
chose the down-left arrow, and 60% chose the down-right arrow. The subpanel on the bottom
left represents an attempt to gauge what probabilities of a symbol winning a rational actor
would estimate. For the objective source of uncertainty, the probability of head and tail is
50% each and shown in the left bar. This of course is constant across all sessions.
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For the subjective source of uncertainty, we chose all symbol pairs that in Section 3 were
indicated by subjects as close to interchangeable. The second bar in the subpanel of the
bottom left imagines a participant who almost clairvoyantly knows what fraction of people
chose each symbol. The top right subpanel shows which bets participants chose. In our design,
this choice was done by indicating one of four possible bets. In the bottom right panel, the
histograms of the beliefs about the content of the ambiguous urn are given. Note that this
was not incentivized. Overall, in this design, subjective acts were again more popular than
the objective ones, contrary to what one would expect under ambiguity aversion.
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4.3 Regression analyses This table presents analyses of choosing to bet on the am-
biguous urn. The regression variables are: (i) Beliefs about the content of the ambiguous
urn. This is the perceived % of participants who sent the symbol bet on, i.e., for partic-
ipants who bet on A, the belief is the % of participants believed to have chosen A, and
for participants who bet on B, the % of people believed to have chosen B. For participants
who bet on the objective urn, the belief is the larger % of the two; (ii) Sending A, dummy
indicator for whether that player put symbol A in other participants’ urns; (iii) Betting on
A, also a dummy indicator; (iv) objective urn displayed first, a dummy indicator; (v) choice
A displayed first, another dummy indicator.
Not surprisingly, people bet on the symbol in the ambiguous urn that they believed to be
more prevalent.7 In addition, there is no significant impact of displaying the objective urn first
7However, this belief elicitation was not incentivized and was asked after making the bet, so cognitive
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TABLE II
Choosing Objective (0) vs Subjective Urn (1) - probit model
Belief [%] 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(0.00827) (0.00811) (0.00843) (0.00828)
Sending A 0.00911 0.0363 0.0460 0.0730
(0.253) (0.249) (0.259) (0.255)
Betting on A 0.225 0.218 0.410 0.409
(0.262) (0.259) (0.280) (0.278)
Objective urn displayed first 0.151 0.130
(0.227) (0.225)
Choice A displayed first -0.546∗ -0.542∗
(0.244) (0.243)
Symbol pairs FE Yes No Yes No
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(and the coefficient has opposite sign than one would expect under an anchoring hypothesis).
For some reason, displaying A first lowers the probability of choosing the ambiguous urn.
But, choosing or sending A has no significant impact on choosing the ambiguous urn. Finally,
the results are robust to controlling for fixed effects for symbol pairs.
5 Conclusion
Ambiguity aversion is an active area of research. It has been applied to explain puzzles
and suggest policies. A key question is whether ambiguity aversion is a preference or a mis-
application of a heuristic. This paper asks if economically substantial ambiguity aversion
really exists as a preference. In our laboratory experiment, fundamental uncertainty is gen-
erated by participants rather than the experimenter. Asymmetric information is eliminated.
The experimenter does not know and no single other subject knows the true probabilities.
Our results indicate that very few people, if any, are ambiguity averse to an economically
meaningful extent. Future research may explore if unlearning the wrong heuristic predicts
changing behavior, for example, by becoming more likely to choose the ambiguous urn over
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A Original Instructions in German
22
Appendix Figure A.1: Instructions, Send Symbol, Choose Act
23
B English Translation of Instructions
In this experiment you can bet on the result of two coin throws. The two coin throws differ as follows:
Coin 1 is a standard coin with Heads and Tails. It is thrown randomly by the computer, Heads and Tails
are equally likely. Coin 2 is a symbol coin, and falls either on side A or side B. On which side it falls is decided
as follows: First, each participant in this session chooses either A or B. Then the coin in this metaphorical
coin throw falls on the side chosen by the majority of participants, excluding you. Thus the symbol coin falls
on A, if among the other participants, that is all participants except you, more chose A than B; otherwise
it falls on B, if among the other participants more participants choose B than A. In this session, there is an
even number of participants. As your choice is excluded for the coin throw, an odd number of participants
decides the result of the throw. Both coins fall on one side, it is impossible that a coin lands on its edge.
Now please first choose A or B. This choice is irrelevant for you personally, but influences whether the
symbol coins of the other participants land on A or B. Please choose one of the following symbols
[radio buttons for choice of A or B].
Appendix Figure A.2: Please choose one of the two symbols
Now please consider the following four different bets. These, and thus your possible earnings, depend on
the throw of the standard coin and the symbol coin, that is the choices of the other participants. Please
specify for each bet what you think its value is. In other words, if you could buy the bet, how much would
you maximally pay for it? Please enter a value between 0 and 400 Cents without entering a currency symbol.
You are not buying these bet, instead you will receive the bet for which you indicated the highest value, for
free (if you assign the same highest value to two or more bets, the bet which is listed first below is what
you will get). As soon as all participants have made their choice for A or B, and have given her valuation
for the different bets, the session continues as follows: The computer generates the coin throws, a single coin
throw for all participants for the standard coin, and for the symbol coin for each participant individually.
Depending on the combination of the two throws then you personally either win 400 Cents or nothing. While
everything in the experiment is anonymous, there is one exception. On the next screen, we will show you
and all other participants the choices regarding the symbols. The participants will be identified by their seat
number.
[4 bets displayed in tables].
24
Appendix Figure A.3: How much is this lottery worth?
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0 1 2 3 4
Smiley
Willingness to Pay
Heart - Smiley (1/2)
Heads Tails
Heart Smiley













































































0 1 2 3 4
Smiley
Willingness to Pay
Heart - Smiley (2/2)
Heads Tails
Heart Smiley
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (1/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (2/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (3/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle














































































0 1 2 3 4
Up-Left Angle 
Willingness to Pay
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle 
Heads Tails
Up-Right Angle Up-Left Angle 


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Down-Right Angle
Willingness to Pay
Down-Left Angle - Down-Right Angle (1/2)
Heads Tails
Down-Left Angle Down-Right Angle



















































































0 1 2 3 4
Down-Right Angle
Willingness to Pay
Down-Left Angle - Down-Right Angle (2/2)
Heads Tails
Down-Left Angle Down-Right Angle




















































































0 1 2 3 4
Full Ball 
Willingness to Pay
Empty Ball - Full Ball 
Heads Tails
Empty Ball Full Ball 


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Empty Square 
Willingness to Pay
Filled Square - Empty Square 
Heads Tails
Filled Square Empty Square 




















































































0 1 2 3 4
Vertical Bar
Willingness to Pay
Horizontal Bar - Vertical Bar (1/2)
Heads Tails
Horizontal Bar Vertical Bar
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Vertical Bar
Willingness to Pay
Horizontal Bar - Vertical Bar (2/2)
Heads Tails
Horizontal Bar Vertical Bar



















































































0 1 2 3 4
Up-Down 
Willingness to Pay
Left-Right - Up-Down 
Heads Tails
Left-Right Up-Down 
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White Number 
Willingness to Pay
Black Number - White Number 
Heads Tails
Black Number White Number 
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Theta 
Willingness to Pay
Phi - Theta 
Heads Tails
Phi Theta 

















































































0 1 2 3 4
Inverted Question Mark 
Willingness to Pay
Question Mark - Inverted Question Mark 
Heads Tails
Question Mark Inverted Question Mark 
Appendix Figure C.16: Question Marks
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D Participant-Generated Urn and Belief Elicitation
On the first screen, subjects are asked to send a symbol, and place a bet:
Appendix Figure D.1: Choice of symbol to send and choice of bet
On the second screen, their beliefs were elicited (non-incentivized, single prior):
Appendix Figure D.2: Belief elicitation
Appendix Figure D.3 shows the resulting game for N = 3, where participants have a choice to bet on
either heart (h) or smiley (s). Prizes are 0 and 1 respectively, c denotes the certainty equivalent of the
objective lottery that gives the two prizes 0 and 1 with equal probability. The game has 26 Nash equilibria in
pure strategies: (Hh,Hh,Hh);(Hh,Hh, Sh);(Hh,Hs, Sh);(Hs,Hs, Sh), and permutations thereof by player
order and symmetry in heart/smiley.
43
Appendix Figure D.3: Natural Source of Ambiguity: N = 3
Player 3 (Hh)
(Hh) (Hs) (Sh) (Ss)
(Hh) (1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (c, 1, c) (c, 0, c)
(Hs) (0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 1) (c, 1, c) (c, 0, c)
(Sh) (1, c, c) (1, c, c) (c, c, 0) (c, c, 0)
(Ss) (0, c, c) (0, c, c) (c, c, 0) (c, c, 0)
Player 3 (Hs)
(Hh) (Hs) (Sh) (Ss)
(Hh) (1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (c, 1, c) (c, 0, c)
(Hs) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (c, 1, c) (c, 0, c)
(Sh) (1, c, c) (1, c, c) (c, c, 1) (c, c, 1)
(Ss) (0, c, c) (0, c, c) (c, c, 1) (c, c, 1)
Player 3 (Sh)
(Hh) (Hs) (Sh) (Ss)
(Hh) (c, c, 1) (c, c, 1) (0, c, c) (0, c, c)
(Hs) (c, c, 1) (c, c, 1) (1, c, c) (1, c, c)
(Sh) (c, 0, c) (c, 1, c) (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(Ss) (c, 0, c) (c, 1, c) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
Player 3 (Ss)
(Hh) (Hs) (Sh) (Ss)
(Hh) (c, c, 0) (c, c, 0) (0, c, c) (0, c, c)
(Hs) (c, c, 0) (c, c, 0) (1, c, c) (1, c, c)
(Sh) (c, 0, c) (c, 1, c) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(Ss) (c, 0, c) (c, 1, c) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1)
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Down-Right Arrow - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Down-Left Arrow - Down-Right Arrow (Session 1/2, N = 30)
Down-Left Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Left Arrow (Subjective Urn)
Down-Right Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Right Arrow (Subjective Urn)













































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Down-Right Arrow - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Down-Left Arrow - Down-Right Arrow (Session 2/2, N = 28)
Down-Left Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Left Arrow (Subjective Urn)
Down-Right Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Right Arrow (Subjective Urn)













































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Up-Left Angle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle (Session 1/2, N = 30)
Up-Right Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Right Angle (Subjective Urn)
Up-Left Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Left Angle (Subjective Urn)













































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Up-Left Angle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle (Session 2/2, N = 28)
Up-Right Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Right Angle (Subjective Urn)
Up-Left Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Left Angle (Subjective Urn)














































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Large Circle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Large Circle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Small Circle in Subjective Urn















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Small Circle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Small Circle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Large Circle - Small Circle (Session 1/1, N = 30)
Large Circle (Objective Urn) Large Circle (Subjective Urn)
Small Circle (Objective Urn) Small Circle (Subjective Urn)
Appendix Figure E.5: Large vs. Small Circle
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